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 ABSTRACT 
 Events during Russia's Civil War (1918-20) produced a serious refugee crisis 
 focused on the port of Novorossiisk  in south Russia towards the end of 1919 
 and the opening months of 1920. Lloyd George's Coalition Government was 
 persuaded to support a rescue mission of selected refugees with most to fear 
 from a Bolshevik victory. The decision was taken against Admiralty advice 
 and against Treasury unwillingness to meet expected high resettlement costs.  
 Thousands of White Russians were rescued and, without wishing or planning 
 the end, the British Government found itself saddled with distracting refugee 
 responsibilities in the politically unstable Protectorate of Egypt.     
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On  27th and 29th January,1920, in London, a special Cabinet meeting of the Lloyd 
George Coalition government convened to decide upon a response to a growing 
humanitarian crisis focused on the port of Novorossiisk situated on the east coast of 
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the Black Sea.1 In peacetime a pleasant town of  60,000 inhabitants, it had been 
transformed into a significant base for receiving and distributing British military aid 
for anti-Bolshevik forces in the region. These activities, as well as various advisory 
functions, were supervised by the staff of the British Military Mission in south Russia.  
 
Cabinet concern with the issue arose as one of the concluding events of the Russian 
Civil War in south Russia. Anti-Bolshevik forces, following earlier successes, were 
being pressured by revolutionary Red armies into hasty, disorderly, retreats. The aim 
of the retreating Whites was to reach the port of Novorossiisk, 'a magnet which acted 
powerfully on an army which had lost all hope except that of escape'.2  There, it was 
expected, ships would arrive to transport military units to the Crimea where they 
could regroup and continue their opposition to the Bolshevik take-over of power 
 
It was not only military personnel who saw Novorossiisk  as offering hope of escape. 
The port was crammed with thousands of civilians - individuals, families, even village 
groups, supporters of the White, anti-Bolshevik, cause in one way or another.3 Many 
had made their way to the port in packed railway carriages and goods wagons; some 
from distant St. Petersburg. Others had struggled along unmade roads, or arrived by 
sea from other Black Sea ports. They found a city where even money and influence 
could not secure shelter from the inclement winter weather. Desperate for some form 
of protection hundreds of refugees were using the local cement factory, huddled on 
straw and sharing blankets for warmth. The unheated city theatre was overflowing 
with bodies and belongings. Even toilets were used as living, sleeping and eating 
quarters. Railway freight wagons, stranded in the city train station sidings and areas 
outside the city for lack of coal, were packed with individuals grateful for some kind 
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of shelter. A British naval observer noted that 'I found great distress and congestion 
among the Russian refugees at Novorossisk. People living in trains and open trucks up 
the line were in deplorable condition. Deaths from typhus, starvation and exposure 
very numerous'.4 The Grand Duchess Olga Alexandrovna, the Tsar's youngest sister, 
was one of many forced to shelter in a stationary railway van near the port. She was 
fortunate to be recognised and brought to safety by representatives of the American 
Red Cross.5  
 
Civil authorities had lost control of the situation. They lacked the means to maintain 
public order. White Russian troops milling around the town were undisciplined and 
insubordinate. Officers found it difficult to restrain the excesses of their men. The 
situation worsened as more and more demoralised units arrived at the port to wait for 
expected evacuation. Medical and sanitary regulations were unenforceable. Typhus 
was rampant, cholera a constant fear, food was scarce, as was fuel, locally available 
currency worthless. Within a few weeks the pressures of war had transformed 
Novorossiisk into 'a hellhole of disease, insurrection, chaos and confusion'.6  
 
For soldiers and civilians alike only evacuation by sea offered the prospect of escape 
from deteriorating conditions in the port and from the feared retribution of advancing 
revolutionary forces. The White military command, with British and French 
assistance, was gathering shipping to extricate their forces. However, it was not this 
military operation that was on the British Cabinet's agenda in January, 1920. It was 
the fate of non-combatants trapped in Novorossiisk that was under discussion. As 
matters stood there was no plan for getting them away other than reliance on the 
haphazard arrival of rescue ships with owners intent on profit. Berths on these ships 
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had to be paid for. Rates were extortionate - gold, silver, marketable valuables, non-
Russian currencies were insisted on.7 It was a situation where sharp practices, 
venality, bad faith and outright criminality were commonplace as fearful individuals 
sought to strike deals that would secure them berths to safety.  
 
Why were these distant events of concern to the British Government? National and 
government attention was intently focused on the great issues of peace following the 
end of the Great War. There was no driving public clamour over the safety of anti-
Bolshevik refugees.  It could be argued in justification that however heart-rending the 
situation of refugees in the port it was a direct consequence of internal acts of war. 
The Civil War pitted Russians against Russians. It was a domestic issue that 
demanded a domestic solution.  
  
If Britain had been a disinterested observer of Russian affairs such a 'hands-off' 
response might have been  justifiable. This was not Britain's position. At the outbreak 
of the Russian Civil War in 1918 Britain had chosen sides. The Government was 
concerned at the prospect of an established revolutionary Bolshevik regime in Russia 
possessing the means and the will to infect the working classes of Western Europe 
with their own ardour for radical communism. In consequence Britain, France, the 
United States and other countries had adopted interventionist policies aimed at 
supporting and strengthening anti-Bolshevik forces as they struggled to regain power 
lost to a minority communist coup during October, 1917.  
 
This support encompassed technical services, supplies of equipment and clothing, 
financial aid, protective military forces as well as the provision of military advisors. 
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Officially, all measures short of war, although in north Russia around the areas of 
Murmansk and Archangel aggressive military actions were fought by British troops.8  
In south Russia, too, it was not unknown for elements of the army, navy and air force 
to engage in front line activities.  
 
The policy of intervention was controversial from the outset. Within the country 
substantial elements of the working classes were disposed to support the ideology of 
social revolution. Neither was there unanimity within the government. For example, 
Lloyd George's view of intervention as a form of limited support was opposed by 
Winston Churchill's bellicose arguments for open, active, military intervention.9  The 
rights and wrongs of all forms of intervention were matters of public, parliamentary 
and governmental debates. However, at the time of intervention, no thought was given 
to the inevitable sufferings of non-combatants on the losing side.   
 
Now, in January, 1920, with total defeat of the White cause imminent and the failure 
of interventionist activities plain for all to see, why was it necessary to spend 
government time on considering the fate of previously overlooked groups of Russian 
non-combatants?  
 
The answer is not to be found in realms of high policy, or in any articulated political 
programme of principled humanitarian concern for the fate of refugees. The Cabinet 
was meeting because a representative of the British government while on a futile 
political mission in south Russia had promised General Denikin, head of the White 
Russian forces in the region, that in the event of defeat British authorities would 
evacuate the families of White officers to a place of safety. Crucially, this generous 
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promise, or guarantee as it came to be known, was made without prior London 
approval. It represented personal initiatives reflecting a highly sympathetic 
assessment of the tragic situation confronting the dispossessed, displaced, families of 
those the British Mission was intent upon assisting. The Cabinet had now to decide 
upon an official response to an unauthorised individual initiative that involved Britain 
not only in previously unconsidered policy issues but also in the prospect of 
burdensome financial costs..   
 
Mackinder 
The representative who had caused this flurry of Governmental concern was Halford 
Mackinder, Unionist Member of Parliament for the Glasgow Camlachie constituency 
since 1910. He was a prominent advocate of an expansive Imperial cause, and 
influential in the development of geopolitical studies as an academic at Oxford and 
the London School of Economics. In 1919 he was appointed British High 
Commissioner in South Russia.10  
 
The reason for the appointment lay in Paris. There the Allied Council, grappling with 
problems of peace, had accorded de facto recognition of the nationalist aspirations of 
Georgia. Armenia and Azerbaijan - all previously part of the Imperial Russian 
Empire. The dislocations and confusion of the Civil War had provided these countries 
with an opportunity to declare their independence of Russian rule. Allied politicians 
in Paris approved this development believing in the need for independent, non-
Russian aligned, buffer states to assist in the containment of revolutionary Russian 
influence in Europe. On taking up his post the newly created High Commissioner was 
told that he was to give Denikin 'moral support and advice', but no promises of further 
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aid and with the firm understanding that 'It is with national aspirations of the [border 
states] that H.M. Government is largely concerned'.11  
 
Mackinder arrived in Novorossiisk on 1st January, 1920. By the 10th he was at 
General Denikin's command headquarters at Tikhoretsk. He had a ticklish task ahead 
of him. As far as Denikin was concerned the three Transcaucasian states had been 
wrested illegally from Russia. He was committed to maintaining Russian boundaries 
at their pre-war extent. 'Russia, one and indivisible' was, for Denikin, a matter of 
faith.12 Initially, he resisted recognising the newly independent states, but the rapidly 
deteriorating military situation compelled him too to 'concede de facto independence 
of the border governments who are carrying on the struggle against Bolshevism'.13 
The recantation was wrung out of Denikin by Mackinder and General Holman, head 
of the British Military Mission also present at the meeting. In the event this was a 
totally meaningless concession. By this time the White Russian leader did not have 
either military or administrative authority to devise or implement any meaningful 
political policy.  
 
However reluctantly, agreement had been reached on the main reason for Mackinder's 
mission. Attention then turned to the gloomy military outlook. Concern was expressed 
by General Holman at the low morale of the White forces. Possibly in return for 
Denikin's grudging  acceptance of a repugnant policy Mackinder agreed 'at the urgent 
instance of General Holman' to a proposal intended to stiffen military resolve in 
Denikin's command.14 It took the form of a promise that, if it became necessary, the 
British would ensure the safety of wives and children of White Army officers. In 
addition personnel of the Military Mission would form a protective rearguard should 
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the need for evacuation arise. Mackinder gave this promise 'without referring home', 
ostensibly because the telegraph lines had been cut.15    
 
Mackinder had to justify his unauthorised action to London. This was done in a 
lengthy report, classified as secret, to the Foreign Office. It was academic in style and 
content treating political, personal, social, military and economic and policy matters. 
Mackinder had not had all the time he wished to prepare the report 'but the time is 
critical, and I think that His Majesty's Government will desire to have my views at 
once ... since it is obvious that a policy should be adopted and decisions taken with as 
little delay as possible'.16  In truth, time and events had already rendered most of the 
report a dead-letter. The report was sent while still on board the H.M.S. Centaur off 
Marseilles. The main report came with eight appendices. One of the shortest, 
Appendix E, introduced the only significant practical outcome from Mackinder's 
mission.  In it Mackinder outlined the 'guarantee' he had given General Denikin. He 
explained that Denikin's troops were losing their fighting effectiveness due, in part, to 
low morale. Many officers were convinced that Britain was ready to abandon them 
and their cause. Anti-interventionist speeches by British politicians, quickly reported 
in White Russian military circles, gave support to this view. Another factor affecting 
performance was the increasing number of officers worried about the fate of their 
families stranded in the path of advancing Bolshevik forces. Officers were absenting 
themselves to escort their families to safety. Others had simply lost their capacity for 
action, weighed down with worry. This analysis of the military situation reflected the 
views of General Holman. He was of the opinion that a promise to protect families of 
officers would improve military effectiveness. However, General Holman 'did not 
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consider that the necessity [of evacuation] will arise if all Russian officers rise to the 
great occasion which confronts them'.17  
 
In expressing such a view Holman was guilty of a serious misreading of the 
developing military situation. Like many British officers, he had identified  closely 
with the Whites. He subscribed to the view that 'they were fighting for a cause which 
is just, and for objects which are sound and possible of attainment'.  He was 
convinced that the Bolsheviks 'will lose' because of their lying and brutality and 
because their leaders were 'alien' and their driving instincts were destructive, not 
constructive. As he put it - 'they will be found out'.18 These sentiments were not 
unusual at the time, but General Holman had developed a closer emotional attachment 
to his Russian allies than was common among British officers.  He was unusual in that 
he spoke Russian; he had qualified as a first-class interpreter in 1895.  In later years 
he attained the same standard in French and German.  In 1905 he was attached to 
Russian forces during the Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria and as a consequence 
was invested with the Order of St. Stanislaus and awarded a Russian war medal.  His 
background gave him an understanding of and a deep sympathy for the Russians.  For 
him there was no doubt that the Mackinder guarantee, assuming responsibility for the 
safety of civilians, was an unavoidable moral obligation  - 'it seemed unthinkable that 
we could leave these women and children to be murdered in view of the 
encouragement we have given them'.19  
 
British Cabinet response 
Mackinder's secret communication regarding his discussions with General Denikin 
was to be considered by an ill-prepared group of individuals. In the circumstances 
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they could have repudiated Mackinder's unauthorised 'guarantee'. Advice to that effect 
was on offer. General Sir George Milne at GHQ Constantinople had grave doubts 
regarding the practicality of the scheme.20 Admiral Sir John Michael de Robeck, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet and British High Commissioner in 
Constantinople was blunt - 'the scheme of evacuation, of transport and subsequent 
maintenance of refugees will be a heavy charge on the Allies for an indefinite time'. 
He was of the opinion that more active military support would be 'best and cheapest in 
the long run'.21 The outright opposition of the Admiralty to Mackinder's proposal was 
set out clearly in the briefing memorandum prepared for the Cabinet. After stressing 
difficulties and problems involved in the evacuation and resettlement of refugees the 
authors of the memorandum concluded 'with regret that the responsibilities involved 
in Mr. Mackinder's guarantees are too heavy to be met in their entirety'. The 
conclusion was inevitable - 'Half measures have invariably proved to do more harm 
than good ... [In view of the] 'more moderate policy of the Soviet Government the 
Board consider that the time has come to reconsider whether ... any attempt as regards 
evacuation is justified'.22  
 
Despite grave warnings about the likely scale, practicality and costs of Mackinder's 
commitment the Cabinet concluded his promise to Denikin had to be honoured. 
However, the dire warnings had shaped attitudes. The 'guarantee' was accepted, but on 
terms which reduced the costs and changed the nature of what Mackinder had 
proposed. The first step was to interpret the proposal as a transfer from Novorossiisk 
to another part of Russia. In practical terms this meant a transfer of refugees to the 
Crimea, still in White Russian hands. The merit of this proposal was evident - once 
ashore, since the refugees were back in their own country, British authorities would 
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incur no further costs. In support of this decision it was argued that transportation to 
other countries could not be considered 'because of the likely incidence of typhus and 
other diseases' associated with ships arriving from south Russia. There were grounds 
for such concern. The Cabinet earlier had been informed that the s.s. Panama had 
arrived in Malta from south Russia with sick and wounded and with 35 cases of 
typhus. Enough to overwhelm local medical facilities, prevent disembarkation and to 
have the ship itself declared an isolation unit.23 However, there was another even 
more compelling reason for concluding that the Crimea was an appropriate refugee 
destination. The British Treasury had made it clear that no money was available to 
settle and maintain large numbers of refugees outside Russia. 24 No other Government 
department had the authority to resist Treasury intransigence on this issue. 
 
The Cabinet's adoption of Mackinder's 'guarantee', even in its modified form, was an 
intriguing decision. Another proposal for evacuation was on the committee's agenda  
that same day. John Lowdon, the British Acting Consul-General at Odessa, had 
informed the Foreign Office that he was 'assuring the Russians that in case of 
necessity British will provide transport to take away all who were compromised with 
the Bolsheviks'.25 His assurances were given in an attempt to quell rising panic in the 
port at the approach of Red forces. In practical terms he was assuming responsibility 
for the evacuation of 30,000 refugees, more or less on the same lines as later proposed 
by Mackinder. The response to Lowdon's initiative was a blunt refusal to engage in 
further humanitarian interventions. He was informed that 'it is impossible to evacuate 
refugees from Odessa or any other Russian port for on sanitary grounds no country 
will receive them. In these circumstances the only policy is for the population to 
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organise itself for a vigorous defence'.26 A bleak outlook, with even a transfer to the 
Crimea ruled out. 
 
What explains these different outcomes?  Why was Novorossiisk treated as a special 
case? Mackinder's proposal was accepted because the agreement with Denikin was 
viewed as a formal political contract. An agreement so public in its nature that its 
repudiation would have led to recriminations and further loss of trust on the White 
side. Lowdon's bold individual initiative was not seen in this light and so was easier to 
disavow. Additionally, national rivalries had come into play. Odessa fell within the 
sphere of responsibility of the French. It was up to them to assume responsibility for 
'their' refugees. When this eventuality did arise before the loss of the port to the Reds 
in February, 1920, the chaotic arrangements for evacuation led to a great loss of 
civilian lives. 
 
Having in mind only the transfer of refugees from Novorossiisk to the Crimea or other 
Russian ports Cabinet approval of the 'guarantee' was telegraphed to the regional 
authorities. The evacuation of refugees had received official sanction.  
 
Local initiatives 
While politicians in London shaped their preferred solution to the refugee problem 
events in south Russia had acquired a direction and momentum of their own. The 
London policy formulation reached Admiral de Robeck on 30th January,1920. He 
was not pleased with the contents of the message. Although he had earlier advised 
against accepting the 'guarantee' he now took issue with the instruction to evacuate 
refugees to the Crimea. 'The decision means that H.M. Government are willing to 
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transfer sick and wounded and others in danger from an area which is safe for at least 
a month to an area which may be enemy territory in a fortnight. This is therefore no 
sort of observance of the guarantee given by Mackinder in the name of H.M. 
Government which implied the wives and families of Officers would be placed in 
safety if and when the necessity arose ... I have already removed 2000 refugees from 
Novorossisk and about 1200 wounded, and from the Crimea 1000 wounded. 
Arrangements for these have already been made at Constantinople, Salonika and 
Varna'.27 None of these destinations had featured in the British Cabinet's plan for 
refugee settlement. There was an all too obvious disconnection between the expressed 
intentions of central government and decisions taken by their official representatives 
'in the field'. In addition, even before the Cabinet had formulated a refugee policy, on 
25th January, 1920, the first shipload of Mackinder refugees had left for Prinkipo, one 
of the Turkish Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmara. 
 
Rethinking the issue 
It was evident that Admiral de Robeck was pursuing a humanitarian evacuation policy 
of his own devising regardless of contrary orders from London. On 3 February, 1920, 
he ordered two naval transports, the Rio Negro and Rio Pardo, to embark refugees 
from threatened Odessa, not directly a British responsibility. On 6 February the Rio 
Pardo left the port with over 1400 refugees. The Rio Negro cast off with the same 
number. In normal circumstances both ships had a carrying capacity of 750. The Rio 
Prado sailed for Constantinople, while the Rio Negro was finally routed to Salonika 
where healthy refugees boarded trains for Serbia on 14/15 February. As the captain of 
the Rio Negro put it -'noble little Serbia took them from us'.28 A neat extempore 
operation that gave no hint of what was to follow. It was equally evident that 
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Mackinder's guarantee was already being executed in a manner contrary to Cabinet 
intentions. A new basis for officially sanctioned actions was required urgently. 
 
This was the task of a conference in Whitehall arranged for 19 and 20 February, 1920. 
The participants at this gathering were asked to 'Consider the Question of Evacuating 
Refugees from South Russia'. In attendance were representatives of the Admiralty, 
War Office, Treasury, Foreign Office, Colonial Office and the Ministry of Shipping. 
The  issue was to receive serious attention.  
 
The first step was to review the Mackinder guarantee in the light of the shaping 
military realities in south Russia. It was agreed that the Crimea was not a safe haven 
for refugees; further, it should never have been considered to be so. A conference 
majority believed the original Crimea proposal was not 'strictly in accordance with the 
guarantee'. It was never Mackinder's intention to transfer refugees from one place of 
danger only to decant them in a similarly threatened locality. This revisionist 
interpretation did not impress Admiralty representatives. Obdurate, as before, they 
maintained that 'the practical difficulties render help on any sufficient scale 
impossible. The Crimea should be regarded as the asylum for refugees and held by 
General Denikin'.29 A view based either on a hopelessly sanguine interpretation of 
events; or on a hard-headed analysis indicating that the high, unknown, costs involved 
did not justify the uncertain practical results. In both cases alleviation of human 
suffering was not a consideration of over-riding importance. Forceful though it was 
this view did not carry the day.  
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Mackinder had left the problem of where the refugees were to be settled for others to 
solve. Outside Russia, certainly, but where?  British transported refugees already had 
been landed at Salonika and Prinkipo as part of locally arranged emergency measures. 
Now an agreed general policy had to be formulated to cope with expected greater 
numbers to follow. The conference participants lacked detailed knowledge of 
operational circumstances, but concluded that Salonika and Romania would provide 
needed safe havens. Neither Greece or Romania had been consulted on the issue. This 
decision, the product of flabby, loose, thinking, in no way contributed to the solution 
of grave practical problems facing Britain's representatives in south Russia. More 
useful was the understanding that costs of transporting refugees to settlement 
destinations should be borne by Britain.  
  
There was perfect clarity, however, about the aim of British support. Asylum abroad 
was to be offered only to wives and families of Russian officers. In the event of a 
general military collapse in south Russia defeated troops would have to find shelter in 
the Crimea which was expected to be defended by General Denikin. It was 
acknowledged that this decision would not be popular with the Whites - 'the odium of 
leaving the Civil population and Volunteer Army in the Crimea to their fate, will 
inevitably fall on the British Government'.30 
 
Four weeks or so before the final evacuation of military and civilians from 
Novorossiisk a revised refugee policy had been formulated. This time the refugee 
issue was placed within the broader context of Britain's interests in the region. It was 
made clear that Britain's military commitment was to end; no further military aid was 
to be offered the Whites other than assistance in military  transfers to the Crimea. It 
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was confirmed that Mackinder approved refugees would be evacuated; other civilians 
would have to fend for themselves.  
 
One crucial aspect of the refugee issue remained unresolved. As before the Treasury 
agreed that funding transportation was a legitimate Mackinder cost. The costs of 
resettlement were not so regarded. Obviously funding would have to be found by 
someone from somewhere to ensure the survival of refugees wherever they were put 
ashore. The solution proposed was firm and confident -'The Allies (including 
America) to supply funds for their further support.' 31 It is not clear how conference 
members, experienced specialist administrators came to believe in the willingness of 
other countries to accept financial burdens that Britain herself was reluctant to 
underwrite. In the event, not a single country offered to share the likely financial 
burden. The financial consequences of support for refugees remained a problem 
waiting to be solved.   
 
Evacuation 
Denikin, Mackinder and Holman had met on 10th January, 1920. Mackinder was on 
his way home by the 16th. By the 19th a British office had been opened in 
Novorossiisk with orders 'to evacuate everybody who can trace relationship with 
Naval or Military officers, no one else'.32 By 25 January, only 15 days after 
Mackinder's discussions with Denikin, and before London had formulated any kind of 
directing policy, 1,600 refugees had been processed to sail on the s.s.Hannover for the 
safety of Prinkipo. A remarkable exercise of urgency and organisation in deteriorating 
military and administration circumstances. 
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This rapidity of response was associated with locally taken decisions owing little to 
Cabinet rulings or, even, to Mackinder's proposals. The initial governing principle 
was the rescue of wives and families of White Russian officers. However, during the 
preparatory stages of the evacuation process it was decided 'to authorise the 
evacuation of not only the wives and families of officers, but also of officials of the 
various departments connected with the Administration, both military and civil' of the 
Don and Volunteer armies.33 Almost as an afterthought, it was realised that such 
personnel were immediate candidates for execution when captured. This widening of 
the eligibility for rescue offered new hope for many individuals stranded in 
Novorossiisk without resources to purchase a berth on commercial rescue ships. The 
British ships came with the offer of free passages. Inevitably the British vetting office 
was overwhelmed with refugees frantic to secure berths on British ships. 
 
This vetting process was crucial. Without official documents issued by the British 
there was no way out on Mackinder ships. All refugees had to convince British 
authorities of their White Russian credentials before being considered for evacuation. 
First they had to present themselves at a Russian Bureau where their personal details 
were checked and recorded. Then, armed with a talon, or certificate, they were 
required to present themselves at the desks of British interviewers where 'closer 
scrutiny of the merits of individual cases was gone into'.34  Refugees had to convince 
British examining officers that their family, military and political connections were 
such as to place them in danger if captured by the Reds. Success at this stage was 
followed by a medical examination. This was an important hurdle. The authorities 
were trying to contain the spread of typhus and cholera. Those already infected, or 
showing early signs of these conditions were refused exit visas.  
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For British officers given the task of offering or denying individuals and families the 
means of escape the process was harrowing and emotionally draining. One account of 
the time reveals officers relying on humanitarian instincts and personal assessments 
rather than official directions when making their assessments - 'I was examining 
people of our own class who did not appear to possess any relatives in the services, to 
these I allotted passages on the grounds of having an uncle in the Crimean War, a fact 
that I could not by any means trace'.35 As a result of such individual judgments and a 
liberal interpretation of family connections to include distant relatives, close friends 
and useful dependants, individuals of widely varying social and professional 
backgrounds received boarding passes. 
 
When 'all the average person seemed to be thinking about was how to get away to 
Constantinople under the Mackinder evacuation scheme' it was inevitable that 
ineligible individuals tried to circumvent the vetting system. The weakness of the 
selection process was that it was not always possible for either Russian or British 
officials to distinguish between authentic and fraudulent claimants. In the prevailing 
chaotic circumstances there was neither the means nor time to investigate individual 
personal backgrounds. This was especially the case once eligibility for evacuation had 
been broadened beyond officers' families. For one observer of the confused scene 'it 
soon became obvious that a large number of the applicants were neither members of 
officers' families, nor sick, wounded or incapacitated officers, who were the people 
we had undertaken to get away... The result of all this confusion, for which the 
Russians were not wholly to blame, was that all sorts of people were taken off who 
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might quite well have been left behind, while others, whose position was much more 
perilous in the event of the Bolshevists coming, had no chance to get away'.36 
 
Call for ships 
The British desire to maintain the momentum of evacuation was not matched with 
similar urgency by the refugee community. During February, 1920, only two further 
ships, His Majesty's Transport Kapurthala (189) and s.s. Hapsburg (806), carrying 
fewer than 1,000 refugees between them, and sailing with empty berths, left the port. 
Many more had registered for evacuation, but had simply not turned up at the 
dockside. This no-show behaviour was not to the liking of naval authorities charged 
with implementing the Mackinder guarantee. If the difficulty in persuading refugees 
to embark continued then 'it would become necessary to issue a notice that the 
evacuation by us is looked upon as completed. We cannot keep ships waiting about 
forever'.37 The irritation of hard-pressed embarkation staff engaged in an emergency 
humanitarian operation is understandable. Why, now, with rescue ships moving into 
place were intended recipients of British assistance reluctant to take up the offer? The 
explanation was simple enough. Living on unfounded rumours and baseless hope 
refugees had persuaded themselves that Bolshevik advances had been stemmed and 
that White victories would transform the situation. Such wishful thinking allowed 
individuals to believe that there would be no need to take the radically life-changing 
decision to abandon Russia.  
 
Around this time of uncertainty among refugees General Holman signalled London 
that 'the moment of extreme danger for families of officers contemplated by 
Mackinder and myself had arrived'. He pleaded for all available commercial and naval 
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ships to be sent at once to aid the refugees.38 Six further ships, additional to the three 
that had sailed during January and February arrived to assist in the rescue operation 
that lasted until 23 March, 1920.39 With the knowledge that the British Mission was to 
transfer to the Crimea with the military forces, refugees were compelled to confront 
the harsh, unchangeable, reality of their situation. Previous indecision gave way to 
panic. Novorossiisk became a 'sick, desperate, terrified city with mobs of people 
surging to every point where they thought there might be hope of safety, or 
evacuation'.40 Years later, in melancholic reflection, General Denikin recalled that 'a 
fierce struggle was going on for places on board - a struggle for life. Many were the 
human tragedies enacted in the town during those terrible days. Many bestial instincts 
were brought to light at this moment of supreme danger, when the voice of conscience 
was stifled and man became an enemy of his fellow man'.41 
 
All available shipping, for troops as well as for refugees, left the port in states of gross 
overcrowding. Yet, even in the chaotic day and night preceding the final military 
evacuation the plight of civilians was not forgotten. Arrangements had been made 'on 
the quayside for the reception of refugees who might decide at the last minute to leave 
the town, but very few came.'42 The British Mission withdrew to Feodosia in the 
Crimea where General Milne reported that the 'Mackinder guarantee had been 
fulfilled'.43  Official British involvement in the evacuation of refugees from south 
Russia was over. 
 
At the War Office there was satisfaction at the way the civilian evacuation had been 
handled. It was 'a fine piece of work, and shews (sic) up in agreeable contrast to the 
French performance at Odessa'.44 It was noted also that 'the conduct of the British was 
 21 
in marked contrast to that of the representatives of certain other countries who 
charged exorbitant sums for carrying refugees across the Black Sea'.45 In this case 
official satisfaction was not out of place. There were good reasons for self-
congratulation. A guarantee, given without higher approval and without detailed 
consideration of costs or consequences, had been redeemed as a matter of national 
honour, and from the Army's point of view a sense of obligation, in perilous 
circumstances.  The result of the Mackinder inspired operation, in human terms, was 
the rescue of around 10,000 refugees.46 This figure was in addition to around 3000 
patients carried on hospital ships and the 5000 or so refugees rescued as a result of 
Admiral De Robeck's individual initiatives. 
 
The early evacuations were conducted in reasonable order. Arranging suitable 
destinations for following consignments of refugees became more challenging tasks. 
Official guidance from London offered no help in deciding upon settlement 
destinations. Practical decisions had to be taken by those in charge of the immediate 
evacuation - naval and army authorities. Much was being attempted in a short time. 
Haste and confusion attending the general evacuation of the port meant that 
destinations of some ships were 'quite unknown even to the Embarking Staff of the 
Military Landing Officer who superintended the embarkation' '.47 During this phase 
events were running ahead of planning and organisation. There was no time, or even 
inclination, to have regard for likely future problems. The aim of the military and 
naval authorities was to get as many Mackinder registered refugees as possible out of 





The problem of settlement destinations was not easily solvable. Chosen sites had to be 
reasonably accessible and to have sufficient accommodation for hundreds of refugees, 
with already laid on provision for water, lighting, sewage, medical facilities as well as 
sustainable local food supplies. The scale and speed of the exodus as well as the fact 
that the refugees were in the care of the Army, meant that the British were forced to 
think of emergency accommodation in terms of unused army and old prisoner-of-war 
camps. Such places lacked civilian facilities and comforts but they provided shelter 
and came with basic utility services already installed. At this point these were the 
pressing priorities. 
 
As earlier noted, the first of the Mackinder ships, the s.s. Hannover, carried 1600 
refugees to Prinkipo, a holiday resort not too distant from Constantinople. This 
destination, as early as 1919, had large numbers of Russian refugees living mostly in 
penury and now 'grateful for a cake of soap or a packet of cigarettes'.48 The landing of 
the first Mackinder consignment simply worsened an already dire situation. Other 
settlement destinations had to be found. With Constantinople already teeming with 
refugees and Prinkipo obviously unable to take further shiploads of displaced 
humanity settlement decisions came to embrace a wide spread of initial landings. In 
addition to Constantinople and Prinkipo refugees were disembarked at Lemnos, 
Cyprus, Tuzla and Salonika. 
 
In this list of asylum  destinations there was a notable absence - Egypt. At the time 
this was a British Protectorate possessing a substantial availability of redundant 
military type accommodation and hospital facilities. All reminders of Britain's 
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military campaigns in the Middle East during the First World War. So why was Egypt 
not considered for refugee settlement? During the first meeting to review refugee 
issues in January, 1920, Admiralty representatives expressed the view 'that Egypt in 
its present state of unrest appears to be a most unsuitable destination for these 
refugees who, it should be observed in parenthesis, are invariably the focus of 
political disturbances'.49 There was no dissent from this view. 
 
From the British government's perspective there were political and military problems 
enough in Egypt without importing refugees and their inevitable political baggage. 
Nationalist aspirations, increasingly expressed through violent demonstrations and 
actions were testing and stretching British control on the country. In addition, with the 
state of Constantinople, over-run with destitute refugees, known to all in the region, 
Egyptian authorities were not expected to welcome a British initiative that came with 
the prospect of food scarcities, disorder and diseases in their cities.  
 
In short there were substantial, valid, reasons for excluding Egypt from the list of 
possible refugee destinations. However, by February, 1920, the scale of the refugee 
exodus prompted General Holman to propose that Egypt be 'forced' to accept 
shipments of White Russians.50  He argued that the refugees were a British 
responsibility; Egypt was a British Protectorate, accessible and with readily available 
unused military and prisoner-of-war camps and hospitals. Holman had a strong case. 




This desire to protect Egypt from the adverse consequences of refugee contamination 
ignored an important factor. Egypt was already infected with the refugee virus. 
Military hospitals were caring for White Russian war casualties in substantial 
numbers. For example, on 15 February, 1920, the hospital ship s.s. Empire docked in 
Alexandria to begin discharging over 600 military patients. On the same day, from 
Sebastopol, the Gloucester Castle disembarked close to 500 sick and wounded. 
During March two trips of the Glengorm Castle brought a further 1200 casualties for 
Egypt's military hospitals.51  Russians filling British hospital beds were not 
technically refugees. They were there to be nursed to health and returned as quickly as 
possible to active service. These were not people who had decided to leave Russia. 
The coming problem for the British was that Bolshevik military successes made it 
increasingly difficult for the return process to be implemented. Whether they wished 
it or not thousands of healthy soldiers would find themselves marooned in Egypt; a 
White Russian problem awaiting a solution by the British and the Egyptians.   
 
Whatever the thinking in London British authorities in Constantinople were being 
forced to confront practical issues directly. On 6 March, 1920, Reuters News Agency 
was reporting that preparations for evacuation  were in hand and that it was proposed 
to 'divert' 5,000 refugees to Egypt.(The Barrier Miner, 8 March 1920: 1) Not a 
decision that London had in mind, but events were dictating an unwanted solution. 
The scale of the problem with its resulting pressures on all available landing points 
left the regional British authorities with no practical option other than to allow 
refugees into Egypt in numbers. The first major, rather stumbling, step in this 
direction was centred upon one Mackinder ship - the s.s. Saratov. This was a 
requisitioned Russian ship, in earlier life a passenger ship working the ports of New 
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York, Singapore and Shanghai, now a White Russian hospital ship and mail carrier. 
For refugee work the Saratov was to be crewed by British sailors.   
 
S.S. Saratov 
On March 7, 1920 the Saratov, with a normal passenger capacity of 800, slipped her 
moorings and sailed away from Novorossiisk with over 1400 refugees. The sound of 
distant gunfire was clear. There was relief on board as the ship cast off. There had 
been 'persistent rumours that the evacuees would be put ashore as the ship had been 
requisitioned to take soldiers to the Crimea'.52 The diverse collection of individuals 
and families aboard, not quite the homogeneous social composition envisaged by 
Mackinder, was comforted by the firm belief that their British hosts had accorded 
them special status. They well understood that in the chaos that was Novorossiisk the 
British had expended considerable time and much effort in selecting and transporting 
them to safety. Initially, without any sense of irony, the refugees acknowledged and 
appreciated the idea of being 'guests of the British Crown'.53  This state of relief and 
gratitude was to be seriously tested in the coming weeks.  
 
The Saratov was not well suited to its role as carrier of refugees, although it had been 
pressed into similar service during the evacuation of Odessa. There was cabin 
accommodation and a communal saloon for the exclusive use of a small number of 
the highest of the social elite. Most had to settle themselves in cargo holds, only some 
of which had been primitively adapted for hospital cases with tiered wooden bunks. 
The unadapted holds 'had no bunks, mattresses, bedding - nothing ... In these great 
enormous spaces people were put, women, men, children all together, sick and well, 
old and young - clothing could not be changed as men and women were together. It 
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was impossible to wash'.54 All cabins and holds were crammed with people and their 
possessions but, still, the open deck was crowded with refugees facing the elements 
with only the flimsiest of shelter. Among the latter were 300 last minute boarders - 
boys of 16 and 17 years of age from the elite Emperor Alexander 111 Don Cossack 
Cadet School in Novocherkassk. They marched 150 miles to the nearest railhead to 
make their way to Novorossiisk having come under the protection of General Holman 
who secured their passage. 55  
 
The ship was grossly overcrowded. Inevitably there were 'queues for hot water, for 
bread, for lunch, at the wash-stand basins, at the toilets'. Inevitably, too, there were 
'people who grumbled, who were displeased with everything' but, despite the 
conditions being endured most passengers counted themselves fortunate to be sailing 
away from Novorossiisk.56  
 
As the voyage progressed the refugees maintained morale with organized activities - 
chess tournaments, choral and classical music concerts, literary lectures, Orthodox 
services helped to fill their days but, however they busied themselves there was no 
lessening of worry about their final destination. They were ignorant of what was to 
happen to them. The lack of firm information persuaded some refugees to accuse the 
British of 'stubbornly concealing'  their eventual settlement destination. The knowledge 
was vitally important for family groups and individuals expecting, at some later stage, 
to be reunited with family members and relatives still warring with the Bolsheviks. The 
further they travelled from Russia the more difficult would it become to reconnect. 
Speculation regarding their settlement destination had begun even before the Saratov 
had left port. Constantinople, Tuzla, Salonika and Cyprus had all received refugees in 
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recent months. Most expected the Saratov to follow to one or other of such places. On 
the Saratov, however, there was still uncertainty.  
 
The first stop on the voyage was Constantinople. This was known not to be the final 
destination. Nonetheless those who wished to disembark were allowed to do so. It was 
not an easy decision to make. There was already a serious refugee problem in the city. 
There were food scarcities, a critical shortage of accommodation and tensions between 
Moslems and the thousands of Orthodox Russians now crowding their streets looking 
for ways of earning a living. For those choosing to disembark such issues, all well 
known to those on the Saratov, mattered for less than the calculation that their relatives 
would come first to Constantinople to look for them. Not all who wished to leave the 
ship could do so, however. In the haste and confusion of departure from Novorossiisk 
the baggage that the refugees had brought with them was simply dumped in the 
cavernous holds 'without weighing, without writing, without receipts, without order' as 
one passenger expressed it.57 As a result many of those intending to disembark were 
unable to discover and retrieve their personal items of luggage from the mountains of 
baggage that had to be searched.  For these the only practical choice was to remain on 
the ship with their baggage.58 
 
When the Saratov sailed away from Constantinople it was known that Cyprus was to be 
the final settlement destination. The Saratov docked in Famagusta on 18 March, 1920. 
There the holds were emptied of their baggage and stacked on the dockside. The 
refugees were given orders to prepare for disembarkation. At this point of high 
expectation there was a sudden halt in what had seemed orderly proceedings. The 
refugees were told they would not now be leaving the ship and the unloaded luggage 
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was returned to the holds. The reason was simple but not allowed for by the route 
directors of the refugee ships. The local reception services had been overwhelmed by 
earlier shiploads of refugees. Only 10 days earlier, on 8 March, the s.s. Kherson had 
arrived from Novorossiisk  with almost a thousand sick passengers. The local 
authorities were in no position to cope with a larger  number off the Saratov. 
 
The problem now was - if not Cyprus, where? It took five days to decide the issue. On 
23 March, 1920, the Saratov sailed for Egypt arriving in Alexandria on 25 March. The 
British Government may have had good reasons for excluding Egypt as a settlement 
destination, but the needs of the moment over-rode all political considerations. There 
was no practical or available alternative solution.  
 
Final destination 
The refugees had arrived in a country unready for their arrival. Reception facilities had 
been prepared in hurried fashion. After a period of quarantine they were to be dispersed 
and housed in unused army and prisoner-of-war camps. These camps were intended as a 
short-term solution; a convenient form of holding exercise while the British 
Government urgently sought to find countries willing to accept homeless refugees they 
themselves had no wish to retain in their care. The plan to rapidly divest Britain of 
refugee responsibilities was to prove difficult of attainment. Britain's intervention in the 
Russian Civil War cast a long shadow. Mackinder and General Holman, with military 
and moral reasoning, had forced a decidedly reluctant government to confront the 
refugee problem. In the end the unavoidable deployment of refugees in Egypt was to 
embroil the British Government, despite its earnest desire to be rid of refugee issues, in 
lengthy frustrating international transfer negotiations, mounting financial costs and 
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unwanted political issues while the White Russians remained their responsibility in 
Egypt. Yet, and the qualification is important, despite an obvious lack of purposeful 
conviction, the British had presided over the rescue of thousands of refugees who 
otherwise would have suffered much harsher fates. 
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